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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/559,960	12/08/2005	Michael C. Gaidis	FIS920030127US1	6525

32074 7590 07/27/2010
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION
DEPT. 18G
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HOPEWELL JUNCTION, NY 12533

EXAMINER

GOODWIN, DAVID J

ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
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2818

NOTIFICATION DATE	DELIVERY MODE
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07/27/2010

ELECTRONIC

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DETAILED ACTION

Response to Arguments

1. Applicant's arguments filed 7/9/10 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
2. The applicant argues that Iwata teaches that metal layer (74) is an upper electrode and Iwata does not teach that said metal layer serves a metal hard mask.
3. Note that a "product by process" claim is directed to the product per se, no matter how actually made. See *In re Thorpe et al.*, 227 USPQ 964 (CAFC, 1985) and related case law cited therein which make it clear that it is the final product per se which must be determined in a "product by process" claim, and not the patentability of the process, and that, as here, an old or obvious product produced by a new method is not patentable as a product, whether claimed in "product by process" claims or not. As stated in *Thorpe*,

- a. Even though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself. *In re Brown*, 459 F.2d 531, 535, 173 USPQ 685, 688 (CCPA 1972); *In re Pilkington*, 411 F.2d 1345, 1348, 162 USPQ 145, 147, (CCPA 1969); *Buono v. Yankee Maid Dress Corp.*, 77 F.2d 274, 279, 26 USPQ 57, 61 (2d. Cir 1935).

Note that Applicant bears the burden of proof in such cases as the above case law makes clear.

The limitation must distinguish from the prior art in terms of structure rather than function, *In re Schreiber*, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477-78, 44 USPQ2d 1429, 1431-32 (Fed. Cir. 1997); See also *In re Swinehart*, 439 F.2d 210, 212-13, 169 USPQ 226, 228-29 (CCPA

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1971). Claims directed to apparatus must be distinguished from the prior art in terms of structure rather than function. *In re Danly*, 263 F. 2d 844, 847, 120 USPQ 528, 531 (CCPA 1959). "Apparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a device does." *Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc.*, 909 F. 2d 1464, 1469, 15 USPQ2d 1525, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

4. The applicant argues that Iwata does not teach that the upper metalization (81) is conductively coupled to a metal shield.

5. Iwata clearly teaches that metallization (81) is conductively coupled to a metal shield (74) (fig 101) (column 60 line 1-column 62 line 40).

6. The applicant argues that Iwata does not teach forming a metal shield over a metal hard mask.

7. In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See *In re Keller*, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); *In re Merck & Co.*, 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

8. The applicant argues that Tsang does not teach the metal shield being substantially coextensive with the metal strap.

9. Iwata teaches that the metal shield (74) is substantially coextensive with the metal strap (72) (fig 101).

10. In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections

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are based on combinations of references. See *In re Keller*, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); *In re Merck & Co.*, 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

11. The applicant argues that there is no motivation to combine the references.

12. In response to applicant's argument that the examiner's conclusion of obviousness is based upon improper hindsight reasoning, it must be recognized that any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning. But so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made, and does not include knowledge gleaned only from the applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. See *In re McLaughlin*, 443 F.2d 1392, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971).

13. In response to applicant's argument that there is no teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references, the examiner recognizes that obviousness may be established by combining or modifying the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention where there is some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to do so found either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art. See *In re Fine*, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 USPQ2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988), *In re Jones*, 958 F.2d 347, 21 USPQ2d 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1992), and *KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.*, 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). In this case, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to use the structure of a magnetic tunnel junction taught in Tsang in the structure described by Iwata in order to

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provide a junction comprised of non-magnetic and magnetic layers in order that during writing a current will yield magnetic fields that will reorient the free layer and thereby store data.

Conclusion

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to DAVID GOODWIN whose telephone number is (571)272-8451. The examiner can normally be reached on Monday through Friday, 9:00am through 5:00pm.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Steven Loke can be reached on (571)272-1657. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.

Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see <http://pair-direct.uspto.gov>. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.

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/STEVEN LOKE/

Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2818